












































	 emphasis	added).	Such	conflicts,	to	the	extent	that	they	entail	the	right	of	the		 sovereign	to	suspend	the	normal	legal	order	and	demand	the	‘sacrifice	of	life’	from	citizens	(Schmitt	1996:	35),	are	furthermore	justified	only	by	existential	threats:		 There	exists	no	rational	purpose,	no	norm	no	matter	how	true	…	which	could	justify	men	in	killing	each	other	for	this	reason.	If	such	physical	destruction	of	human	life	is	not	motivated	by	an	existential	threat	to	one’s	own	way	of	life,	then	it	cannot	be	justified.	(Schmitt	1996:	48-49)		 One	might	want	to	conclude	from	this	that	war,	and	its	associated	state	of	exception,	is	a	matter	of	existential	necessity,	of	‘encounter[ing]	an	objective,	external	force	.	.	.	that	makes	a	life-and-death	claim’	(Meier	1995:	15).	However,	as	Schmitt	himself	warns	in	The	Age	of	Neutralizations	and	Depoliticizations,	care	must	be	taken	when	interpreting	concepts	whose	meaning	will	depend	on	their	specific	use	at	the	time:	‘All	essential	concepts	are	not	normative	but	existential.	If	the	center	of	intellectual	life	has	shifted	in	the	last	four	centuries,	so	have	all	concepts	and	words’	(Schmitt,	1996b:	85).		 For	the	meaning	of	‘existential’	itself,	it	is	significant	that	in	this	context	Schmitt	opposes	norms	to	existence,	given	his	opposition	of	norms	to	decisions	elsewhere	in	his	work.	Indeed,	in	Constitutional	Theory	Schmitt	not	only	links	political	existence	
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	 to	a	decision	(‘political	will’),	but	finds	this	will	itself	to	have	an	‘existential	character’:		 The	constitution-making	power	is	the	political	will,	whose	power	or	authority	is	capable	of	making	the	concrete,	comprehensive	decision	over	the	type	and	form	of	its	own	political	existence.	The	decision,	therefore,	defines	the	existence	of	the	political	unity	in	toto.	…	In	contrast	to	any	dependence	on	a	normative	or	abstract	justice,	the	word	‘will’	denotes	the	essentially	existential	character	of	this	ground	of	validity.	(Schmitt	2008:	125,	footnote	and	emphasis	omitted)		 Accordingly,	what	justifies	war	is	not	a	threat	to	bare	existence,	but	to	the	type	and	
form	of	existence,	i.e.	one’s	political	organisation.	‘Each	participant	is	in	a	position	to	judge	whether	the	adversary	intends	to	negate	his	opponent’s	way	of	life	and	therefore	must	be	repulsed	or	fought	in	order	to	preserve	one’s	own	form	of	existence’	(Schmitt	1996:	27,	emphasis	added).			 Such	a	threat	may	still	lead	to	a	situation	of	necessity,	albeit	now	artificially	construed	in	terms	of	the	‘life	or	death’	of	the	political	form.	However,	even	this	necessity	does	not	adequately	capture	Schmitt’s	understanding	of	the	decision	on	the	exception.	After	all,	it	is	not	the	case	that	a	decision	about	the	form	of	political	
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	 existence	is	taken	and	then	defended	in	war,	but	that	the	decision	that	determines	the	form	of	political	existence	is	itself	the	decision	to	go	to	war.		 Perhaps	one	therefore	ought	to	begin	one’s	inquiry	elsewhere,	and	ask	what	role	the	claim	of	necessity	plays	in	relation	to	the	decision	on	the	exception.	In	this	respect,	Williams’	observations	on	necessity	are	again	helpful:		 To	arrive	at	the	conclusion	that	one	must	do	a	certain	thing	is,	typically,	to	make	a	discovery	–	a	discovery	which	is,	always	minimally	and	sometimes	substantially,	a	discovery	about	oneself	…	The	incapacities	[that	limit	the	field	of	options	for	actions]	are	ones	that	help	to	constitute	character,	and	if	one	acknowledges	responsibility	for	anything,	one	must	acknowledge	responsibility	for	decisions	and	action	which	are	expressions	of	character	–	to	be	an	expression	of	character	is	perhaps	the	most	substantial	way	in	which	an	action	can	be	one’s	own.	(Williams	1981:	130)		 Thus,	the	declaration	of	enmity	is	part	of	the	ongoing	struggle	to	define	one’s	own	character,	a	struggle	that,	because	it	involves	claims	of	necessity,	is	thereby	not	defensive	but	productive	of	meaning.	This	struggle	is	an	active	process	for	which	one	cannot	but	assume	responsibility.	Therefore,	when	Schmitt	writes	that	the	exception	‘confirms	not	only	the	rule	but	also	its	existence’	(Schmitt	2005:	15),	‘existence’	here	should	be	understood	as	the	meaning	conveyed	by	having	been	chosen	amongst	a	
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